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The crime of genocide, as one of the most complex crimes ever to be examined and 
prosecuted, is often referred to as the “crime of crimes.” It is never the result of a tragic 
accident, but always a deliberate, conscious, and intentional act. It is never a single act, 
but a collection of acts committed by a number of people acting in consort. Several 
elements of genocide prescribed by the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment 
of the Crime of Genocide (1948) distinguish it from other core crimes. The first one is 
the intention to destroy a protected group – the very specific intention that brings into 
question the core existence of the group itself. The second element is the focus of the 
perpetrator’s intent on a particular group; his intent on destruction has to be directed 
against a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group. No other groups are included on 
that list. Given the significance to the protected group, this paper will focus on some 
important issues relating to the protected groups and their identifications, both in legal 
theory and jurisprudence of international courts. It will also cover some considerations 
on the exclusion of some other groups that are left unprotected from genocide.
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the law must be stable, but it must not stand still.
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Introduction
Genocide is often described as “the crime of crimes”; it represents the manifestation 
of atrocious violence and the conception of evil that deeply shocks the conscience 
of human kind. Although many examples of horrifying crimes have been revealed 
throughout history, the legal term of genocide has not been recognized until the 
middle of the 20th century. that was a time when the “crime without a name”1 was given 
the name “genocide,” a term coined by Raphael Lemkin.2 in its original form, genocide 
referred to the “destruction of a nation or of an ethnic group.”3 Although its meaning 
has somewhat changed through the future development, Lemkin’s word eventually 
conquered the world and became one of “the most powerful in any language.”4
in 1946, the term appeared as a crime under international law when the uN 
General Assembly, in expressing its condemnation of crimes committed during 
the world war ii, adopted the resolution titled “the Crime of Genocide” and invited 
the uN member states to enact the necessary legislation for its prevention and 
punishment. the seriousness of the crime was clearly emphasized. when compared 
1  “we are in the presence of a crime without a name,” winston Churchill once said when referring to 
crimes committed by the Nazis during world war ii. his speech inspired raphael Lemkin to coin the 
term “genocide” from the ancient Greek word genos (which means race or clan) and the Latin suffix 
cide (which means killing).
2  For more information regarding Lemkin’s work see, e.g., Machteld Boot, Genocide, Crimes Against 
Humanity, War Crimes: Nullum Crimen Sine Lege and the Subject Matter Jurisdiction of the International 
Criminal Court 403–404 (Antwerp: intersentia, 2002); sergey sayapin, Raphael Lemkin: A Tribute, 20(4) 
european Journal of international Law 1157, 1157–1162 (2009).
3  raphael Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals 
for Redress (washington, d.C.: Carnegie endowment for international Peace, 1944) reprinted in New 
Introduction by Samantha Power 79 (Clark, N.J.: Lawbook exchange, 2005).
4  david Luban, Calling Genocide by Its Rightful Name: Lemkin’s Word, Darfur, and the UN Report, 7(1) 
Chicago Journal of international Law 1, 5 (2006).
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to homicide, which represents the denial of the right to life of an individual human 
being, genocide was marked as a more serious crime. it was recognized as contrary 
to the moral law, spirit, and aims of the united Nations.5 in its core, it represents 
a denial of the right of existence to entire human groups. But, as will be shown in this 
paper, the destruction of entire human groups in the contemporary understanding 
of genocide does not refer to just any group of people that could be identified as 
the target of genocide. Although the uN General Assembly resolution refers to the 
destruction of racial, religious, political and other groups, the concept of genocide 
was tailored slightly differently in its further development.
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide6 
(hereinafter Genocide Convention), representing one of the first international 
documents on human rights and humanitarian law provided by the uN, was adopted 
two years later. As confirmed by the international Court of Justice (hereinafter iCJ), it 
was “manifestly adopted for a purely humanitarian and civilizing purpose… its object, 
on the one hand, is to safeguard the very existence of certain human groups and, 
on the other, to confirm and endorse the most elementary principles of morality.”7 
Nowadays, its provisions are considered a part of the international customary 
law and jus cogens norms.8 Nevertheless, discussions about this crime have been 
on-going ever since. its extent and magnitude, connected with the emotional idea 
of destroying entire human groups, makes genocide the “crime of crimes,” the most 
horrifying of all known crimes nowadays, and – as the case law of international 
criminal courts often confirms – one that is the most difficult to prove.
1. Why Is Genocide Being Referred to as the “Crime of Crimes”?
the widespread profane opinion favours the belief that genocide exists whenever 
a mass extermination, mass murder, or some other grave violations of human 
rights are accomplished. however, such a wide understanding of genocide is not 
correct in its entirety, even though sometimes it is quite incomprehensible that 
mass exterminations on some area are not recognized as genocide. On the other 
hand, a very similar situation in the same area or in some distant place could be 
5  uN General Assembly, resolution on the Crime of Genocide, 11 december 1946, A/res/96(i).
6  uN General Assembly, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 9 
december 1948, 78 u.N.t.s. 277.
7  Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory 
Opinion, 1951 i.C.J. 15, 23.
8  that opinion was confirmed in the case law of both ad hoc criminal tribunals: Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul 
Akayesu, Case No. iCtr-96-4-t, Judgment, 2 september 1998, para. 495; Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisić, Case 
No. it-95-10-t, Judgment, 14 december 1999, para. 60; Prosecutor v. Georges Anderson Nderubumwe 
Rutaganda, Case No. iCtr-96-3-t, Judgment and sentence in the trial Chamber, 6 december 1999, para. 46; 
Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić, Case No. it-95-5/18-t, Judgment, 24 March 2016, para. 539.
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described as genocide. despite some similarities, either regarding the way the crime 
had been committed or the number of victims, there is a line of distinction between 
genocide and some other crimes, especially crimes against humanity. what is then 
the difference between these crimes that some could be recognized as genocide, 
while others could not? what is that particular element that elevates genocide to 
the throne of the most serious crimes?
the answer is hidden within the definition and concept of genocide. the crime of 
genocide is divided into two elements. the first one is the commission of particular 
acts or actus reus. this represents a physical element of genocide, i.e. the commission 
of concrete acts directed against the group and described as: a) killing the members 
of the group; b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to the members of the group; 
c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its 
physical destruction in whole or in part; d) imposing measures intended to prevent 
births within the group, and e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another 
group.9
the second element of genocide is dolus specialis – the intent to destroy, in whole 
or in part, a protected group, as such. Looking carefully at the perpetrator’s intention 
and his ultimate goal not (just) to commit a murder but to exterminate a protected 
group in whole or in part, the conclusion on the existence of the “crime of crimes” 
could be easily draw. Dolus specialis is that exclusive, significant part of elements that 
makes genocide an exceptionally grave crime. Moreover, the challenge to determine 
dolus specialis before the international courts10 makes genocide a crime difficult to 
prove, albeit not impossible.
As the apparent, significant element of the genocide definition is the object of its 
protection – a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group; no political, sexual, cultural, 
linguistic, or any other group is included on the list. the protection derived from 
the Genocide Convention refers only to these four groups, although the possible 
9  Genocide Convention, Art. 2.
10  Genocide is incorporated into the statutes of the main international criminal courts: Art. 2 of the 
international Criminal tribunal for the former yugoslavia (hereinafter iCty); Art. 4 of the international 
Criminal tribunal for rwanda (hereinafter iCtr); Art. 6 of the rome statute of the international Criminal 
Court (hereinafter iCC). Genocide has been thoroughly examined before ad hoc international criminal 
tribunals; their contribution to that field is without a doubt remarkable, sometimes even ground-
breaking. the conclusions from some of these cases are going to be presented in this paper. Contrary 
to many cases of genocide prosecuted before the ad hoc tribunals, only one case before the iCC has 
been referred to as a crime of genocide so far, but the accused remains at large in spite of the arrest 
warrants issued against him. See Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Case No. iCC-02/05-
01/0 (see more at https://www.icc-cpi.int/darfur/albashir/documents/albashireng.pdf). Furthermore, 
although indisputably perpetrated by individuals, the involvement of the state as the real orchestrator 
of the crime and the existence of state responsibility for the genocide has also been analysed before 
the international Court of Justice and two judgments were delivered in: Case Concerning the Application 
of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina 
v. Serbia and Montenegro), 2007 i.C.J. 43 and Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), 2015 i.C.J. 3.
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inclusion of some others has been discussed during the drafting process. Both dolus 
specialis and actus reus are directed against a particular protected group and all 
elements must be met cumulatively.
these are the elements that differentiate genocide from other serious crimes. For 
example, when compared to murder as part of a widespread or systematic attack 
directed against any civilian population (which could be defined as a crime against 
humanity), genocidal murder is not an “ordinary” murder. it is determined by two 
elements. the first one is manifested in a limitation on the victim’s side – while the 
victim of crime against humanity is any civilian population, the victim of genocide 
has to fulfil the condition of being a member of a protected group. the second 
element refers to the perpetrator’s special intention to destroy a protected group 
in whole or in part, as such. therefore, if any mass murder is not aimed at individuals 
on the account of their belonging to a particular group, and if there is no existing 
intention to destroy that group, one cannot speak of genocide within the terms of 
the Genocide Convention. Although the magnitude of killings, or the number of 
victims, or the scale of extermination can be similar in both cases and indisputably 
indicate a serious breach on human rights, these crimes are not the same.
therefore, when genocide is in question, it is essential to prove that the 
perpetrator not only wanted to commit acts enumerated as actus reus of genocide 
with the special intention to bring destruction to a group, but more importantly 
that he was primarily focused on destruction of specific national, ethnical, racial or 
religious group in whole or in part, as such.
2. Protected Groups Within the Meaning of the Genocide Convention
the term “group” within the definition of genocide is quite narrowly determined 
by simple reference to the type of the protected group: national, ethnical, racial, and 
religious. Although that list provoked significant debate during the drafting process, 
no criteria have been provided for an easier identification of the group. As LeBlanc 
concluded, the drafters of the Genocide Convention “made no serious attempt to do 
so” mostly because “it is unlikely that acceptable definitions could have been agreed 
on.”11 As will be presented more thoroughly in this paper, finding the elements of 
some groups was not an easy task to achieve; in fact, debates about some groups 
have resulted in their exclusion from the list.
Given the significance of the protected group as one of the essential elements 
required for the existence of genocide, this paper focuses on some important 
issues relating to the group itself. knowing the facts from the drafting process of 
the Genocide Convention and bearing in mind the development of human rights 
11  Lawrence J. LeBlanc, The United States and the Genocide Convention 60 (durham: duke university 
Press, 1991).
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in general, as well as the “explicit global dimension of genocide,”12 the following 
questions arise: does the enumeration of only four groups protected by the Genocide 
Convention make its protection too narrow and insufficiently effective? One could 
state that the protection from a crime that has such a horrifying impact on the 
existence of the human group itself should be inherent to all human groups, not 
only to those enumerated in the document. if all other elements are fulfilled, but 
a particular group of victims does not fall within the enumeration of the protected 
group, can one even talk about genocide? Although such a hypothetical situation 
is possible, it is not covered by the Genocide Convention. For example, the case 
of mass murders followed by the perpetrator’s intention to destroy an opponent 
political group or a group of women or homosexuals does not constitute genocide 
if the victims are not identified as the members of one of the protected groups. 
in accordance with the provisions of the Genocide Convention, such particular 
extermination is not genocide, regardless of how frightening and inhuman it might 
be. the inapplicability of the Genocide Convention in such situations, merely because 
the victims do not represent a “proper” group, could be recognized as one of the 
major flaws of the Convention.
2.1. Identification of the Protected Group
when referring to the crime of genocide, one has to be very cautious not to 
lose the focus from the object of the genocidal plan; it is the destruction of the 
protected group. Although is perfectly clear even from the text of the Genocide 
Convention that the destruction of the group necessarily requires commission of 
prescribed acts against individuals – members of the particular group13 – the action 
taken against individuals is not focused on their individual capacity; it represents 
the action taken against the group itself.14 even though it is quite understandable 
that a group does not exist if individuals are not involved, when genocide is in 
question, the role of individuals has to be observed as their exclusive membership 
to the group. As confirmed by the case law of international criminal tribunals, an 
individual victim of genocide is chosen not because of his identity or position,15 but 
12  See more at Martin shaw, Genocide and International Relations: Changing Patterns in the Transitions of 
the Late Modern World 161 (Cambridge: Cambridge university Press, 2013).
13  Prosecutor v. Duško Sikirica, Damir Došen, Dragan Kolundžija, Case No. it-95-8-t, Judgment on defence 
Motion to Acquit, 3 september 2001, para. 89.
14  Lemkin 1944, at 79.
15  it does not matter whether the person is a soldier or a civilian. As concluded before the iCty: 
“…a decision was taken, at some point, to capture and kill all the Bosnian Muslim men indiscriminately. 
No effort thereafter was made to distinguish the soldiers from the civilians.” Prosecutor v. Radoslav 
Krstić, Case No. it-98-33-t, Judgment, 2 August 2001, para. 547. See also Prosecutor v. Vujadin Popović, 
Ljubiša Beara, Drago Nikolić, Ljubomir Borovčanin, Radivoje Miletić, Milan Gvero, Vinko Pandurević, Case 
No. it-05-88-t, Judgment, 10 June 2010, paras. 833 and 866.
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rather on account of his group membership.16 All actions taken against individuals 
should be viewed as the means used to achieve the ultimate genocidal goal – the 
destruction of a protected group.
it is widely accepted that genocide does not entail a single, spontaneous or 
isolated act; it is a “coordinated plan of different actions”17 committed by a number of 
people acting in consort with the intention of achieving the ultimate genocidal aim.18 
in most cases, the gravity and the scale of genocide presume involvement of several 
protagonists.19 it is often connected with other types of social conflicts and represents 
a “phenomenon of political and military conflict.”20 Before the act is committed, the 
group must be identified. it means that the collectivity of the members of a protected 
group is being marked as the victims and objects of genocidal acts.21 this can be done 
by means of either positive or negative identification criteria.
it is a common and widely accepted opinion that the identification of a genocide 
victim requires the so-called positive approach. the intention to destroy is focused 
against a collective of people who have a particular group identity22 – national, 
ethnical, racial or religious – and not a lack thereof.23 these particular unique 
characteristics distinguish the group from others,24 and the focus on these groups 
exclusively distinguishes genocide from other crimes.25 As confirmed before the 
iCJ, it is a “matter of who those people are, not who they are not.”26 starting from 
16  Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, supra note 8, paras. 124 and 125; Prosecutor v. Radoslav Krstić, supra 
note 15, para. 551. See also diane Marie Amann, Group Mentality, Expressivism, and Genocide, 2(2) 
international Criminal Law review 93, 93 (2002).
17  Lemkin 1944, at 79.
18  katherine Goldsmith, The Issue of Intent in the Genocide Convention and Its Effect on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide: Toward a Knowledge-Based Approach, 5(3) Genocide studies and 
Prevention: An international Journal 238, 252 (2010).
19  Prosecutor v. Radoslav Krstić, supra note 15, para. 549.
20  shaw 2013, at 147.
21  victims could be determined in some kind of a genocidal plan or the actions taken against them 
represent a part of the policy. Although the existence of any kind of genocidal plan or policy has not 
been included into the definition of genocide, it is mostly unlikely that the crime could be performed 
without them.
22  Prosecutor v. Ratko Mladić, Case No. it-09-92-t, Judgment, 22 November 2017, para. 3436; Prosecutor 
v. Radovan Karadžić, supra note 8, para. 541.
23  Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakić, Case No. it-97-24-A, Judgment, 22 March 2006, para. 21. See also Prosecutor 
v. Vujadin Popović et al., supra note 15, para. 809.
24  Prosecutor v. Radoslav Krstić, supra note 15, para. 557; Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakić, supra note 23, 
paras. 16–28.
25  Amann 2002, at 93.
26  Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), supra note 10, para. 193.
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Lemkin’s idea, it is clear that genocide was originally conceived as the destruction of 
a race, tribe, nation, or another group with a particular positive identity, not as the 
destruction of various people lacking a distinct identity.27 Positive identification of 
the group was requested in many cases before criminal tribunals, as well as before 
the iCJ. As confirmed before the iCJ, the drafters of the Genocide Convention gave 
close attention to the positive identification28 of groups “with specific distinguishing 
characteristics in deciding which groups would include and which (such as political, 
economic, cultural, sexual or social groups) they would exclude.”29 therefore, positive 
identification of the group focuses on specific distinguishing well-established and 
immutable characteristics. As the iCJ emphasized, the decision of the drafters not to 
include political and cultural groups on the list of protected groups, because they 
lack such characteristics represents further argument for the necessity of positive 
identification.30
in contrast to the positive determination of “who the people are,” the negative 
approach is based on what these people are not. that approach consists of 
identifying individuals as not being part of the group “to which the perpetrators 
of the crime consider that they themselves belong and which to them displays 
specific national, ethnical, racial or religious characteristics.” All individuals rejected 
in this way would “by exclusion, make up a distinct group.”31 this approach has been 
thoroughly elaborated before the international courts. For example, as confirmed in 
the Jelisić case, if the genocidal act of the perpetrator who belongs to the group A is 
directed against several victim groups (B, C, and d), and each of them is protected, 
it may be “within the spirit and purpose of the Genocide Convention to consider 
all the victim groups as a larger entity”32 marked as “non-A group.” Nevertheless, the 
negative approach has been widely rejected. Although it has been recognized that 
the provisions of the Genocide Convention also protect groups “defined by exclusion 
where they have been stigmatized by the perpetrator in this way,”33 the negative 
approach has been considered as not appropriate to define relevant protected 
27  Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakić, supra note 23, para. 21; Prosecutor v. Vujadin Popović et al., supra note 15, 
para. 809; Prosecutor v. Ratko Mladić, supra note 22, para. 3436.
28  See Antonio Cassese, Genocide in The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary 
335, 336 (A. Cassese et al. (eds.), Oxford: Oxford university Press, 2002). See also Prosecutor v. Milomir 
Stakić, supra note 23, para. 22.
29  Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), supra note 10, para. 194.
30  Id.
31  Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisić, supra note 8, para. 71.
32  See quote of the Final report of the Commission of experts formed pursuant to uN s.C. res. 780, at 
Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisić, supra note 8, para. 71, footnote 97.
33  Id. para. 71.
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group34 as “non-someone.” that approach was recognized before the iCJ as well. while 
confirming the necessity of positive identification, the iCJ clearly emphasized that 
the targeted group must not be defined as a “non-serb national, ethnical or religious 
group…”35 As Kreβ emphasizes, by supporting the positive approach to the concept 
of the protected group, the iCJ “guards against the transformation of genocide into 
an unspecific crime of group destruction based on a discriminatory motive.”36
the following question is how to make a clear identification of a national, racial, 
religious, or ethnic group. even though they are mentioned, these groups have neither 
been defined in the Genocide Convention nor have their particular characteristics 
been given. As it has been pointed out,
the preparatory work of the Convention shows that setting out such a list 
was designed more to describe a single phenomenon, roughly corresponding 
to what was recognized before the second world war as national minorities, 
rather than to refer to several distinct prototypes of human groups.37
that does not mean that the terms are useless, but rather that such applicability 
was the drafters intention in the first place. this view has been supported by some 
authors. As Schabas concluded, despite the lack of definitions, the four groups 
overlap and help to define each other. they operate much as four corners which 
connect the area within which the groups find protection, and that could be seen as 
the perception of the drafters of the Genocide Convention – their correspondence 
in a dynamic relationship, when each group contributes to the construction of 
the other. therefore, a search for their autonomous meanings could “weaken the 
overarching sense of the enumeration as a whole.”38
Nevertheless, the drafter’s conclusions and discussions on the particular 
characteristic of groups and reasons for their inclusion or exclusion can be useful 
for their identification in practice. An important platform for a further elaboration 
34  Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brđanin, Case No. it-99-36-t, Judgment, 1 september 2004, para. 685; Prosecutor 
v. Goran Jelisić, supra note 8, para. 72; Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakić, Case No. it-97-24-t, Judgment, 
31 July 2003, para. 512; Prosecutor v. Zdravko Tolimir, Case No. it-05-88/2-t, Judgment, 12 december 
2012, para. 735; Prosecutor v. Vujadin Popović et al., supra note 15, para. 809; Prosecutor v. Radovan 
Karadžić, supra note 8, para. 541.
35  See Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), supra note 10, paras. 66, 185, 191, 
194, 196. that approach has been confirmed in cases before the iCty, e.g., Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisić, 
supra note 8, paras. 71 and 72; Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakić, supra note 23, paras. 16–27; Prosecutor v. 
Radovan Karadžić, supra note 8, para. 541.
36  Claus kreβ, The International Court of Justice and the Elements of the Crime of Genocide, 18(4) european 
Journal of international Law 619, 624 (2007).
37  Prosecutor v. Radoslav Krstić, supra note 15, para. 556.
38  william A. schabas, Genocide in International Law: The Crime of Crimes 124, 129–131 (2nd ed., Cambridge: 
Cambridge university Press, 2009).
SANDRA FABIJANIĆ GAGRO 109
on the group identification is the jurisprudence of international courts. the concept 
of protected groups has been “researched extensively,” but with no generally and 
internationally accepted definitions thereof.39
the basic approaches to providing the definitions and determining the members 
of a protected group could be divided into objective and subjective ones. the 
objective approach is based on the idea that the membership to a group represents 
a “social fact,”40 while the subjective approach recognizes that membership is a “social 
construct” and that the perceptions of both the victim and the perpetrator must 
be taken into account. this distinction does not have a purely theoretical value, but 
also includes a practical significance.41
An objective approach relies on verifiable facts, regardless of the view of 
the victim, or the perpetrator, or any third party.42 such an approach, based on 
scientifically verifiable parameters, was supported in Akayesu case before the iCtr. 
the tribunal tried to identify some essential, objective elements of the protected 
group, but that view was not widely accepted, and “nearly all later judgments by 
international criminal tribunals chose to rely on subjective elements.”43 Moreover, as 
some authors concluded, these definitions “possess their own inherent weaknesses 
and continue to cause problems of interpretation for the tribunals.”44
As noted in the Akayesu case, with a reference on the travaux préparatoires of the 
Genocide Convention, genocide was allegedly understood “as targeting only ‘stable’ 
groups.”45 the main characteristic of a stable group is permanency; its membership 
would seem to be normally “not challengeable by its members, who belong to it 
automatically, involuntarily46 and by birth.”47 the problem with the objective approach 
39  Prosecutor v. Georges Anderson Nderubumwe Rutaganda, supra note 8, para. 56; Prosecutor v. Alfred 
Musema, Case No. iCtr-96-13-t, Judgment and sentence, 27 January 2000, para. 161.
40  On the basis of objective criteria, the Nazis had elaborated detailed rules on who was and was not 
Jewish, with no regard for the individual’s belief about his/her own status or if the person denies his/her 
belonging to the group (schabas 2009, at 125). As will be shown later, tutsis in rwanda were identified 
(and killed) on the basis of their identity cards, which represented the proof of their ethnicity.
41  Guglielmo verdirame, The Genocide Definition in the Jurisprudence of the Ad Hoc Tribunal, 49(3) 
international & Comparative Law Quarterly 578, 579, 588 (2000).
42  Carola Lingaas, Imagined Identities: Defining the Racial Group in the Crime of Genocide, 10(1) Genocide 
studies and Prevention: An international Journal 79, 89 (2016).
43  Carola Lingaas, Defining the Protected Groups of Genocide Through the Case-law of International Courts, 
iCd Brief (december 2015), at 9 (Jul. 20, 2018), available at http://www.internationalcrimesdatabase.
org/upload/documents/20151217t122733-Lingaas%20Final%20iCd%20Format.pdf.
44  Claire de than & edwin shorts, International Criminal Law and Human Rights 70 (London: sweet & 
Maxwell, 2003).
45  Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, supra note 8, para. 511.
46  According to some authors, membership of religious group may be voluntary. Antonio Cassese, 
International Criminal Law 97 (Oxford: Oxford university Press, 2003).
47  Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, supra note 8, para. 511.
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is “that rules on the membership of groups are nearly always disputed,”48 and “as 
the law stands at present there are no definitive objective criteria for determining 
the special features of each protected groups.”49 Nowadays, the membership to 
a protected group is sometimes difficult to establish. even the stability and the 
permanency of the group is being recalled as the grounds for its determination, some 
groups nowadays are not necessarily stable or permanent given that overlapping 
is present in many situations. Members of these non-stable and non-permanent 
groups are quite “flexible” in their roles; they may decide to join the group or to 
leave it. Furthermore, it is not strange for a person to be a member of more than 
one group, starting from birth.50
As noted, the objective approach has not been widely supported and subsequent 
ground-breaking case law of the ad hoc tribunals shows a progressive shift from the 
objective towards the subjective approach,51 giving the focus to the self-identification 
or identification by others. the reasons for this shift have relied on conclusions that 
the membership of a group in applying the Genocide Convention was more of 
a subjective rather than an objective concept52 and that the objective approach is 
“inconsistent with the object and purpose of the Convention.”53 Furthermore, the 
iCty in the Jelisić case has expressed the fear that the objective approach and 
scientifically irreproachable criteria for the determination of a protected group 
would be “a perilous exercise whose result would not necessarily correspond to 
the perception of the persons concerned by such categorization.”54 the tribunal 
recognized that the preparatory work of the Genocide Convention demonstrates 
the intention of drafters to protect only “stable” groups objectively defined and 
whose members belong to the group regardless of their own desires.55 however, 
although the objective approach is applicable in determining a religious group, 
the subjective criterion is considered more appropriate in determining the status 
of other protected groups – national, ethnical, or racial.56 taking into account further 
48  verdirame 2000, at 588.
49  de than & shorts 2003, at 70.
50  Id.
51  Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisić, supra note 8, para. 70; Prosecutor v. Georges Anderson Nderubumwe Rutaganda, 
supra note 8, para. 56. See also robert J. Currie, International & Transnational Criminal Law 112 (toronto: 
irwin Law, 2010).
52  See Prosecutor v. Georges Anderson Nderubumwe Rutaganda, supra note 8, para. 56; Prosecutor v. Alfred 
Musema, supra note 39, para. 161.
53  Prosecutor v. Radoslav Krstić, supra note 15, para. 556.
54  Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisić, supra note 8, para. 70.
55  Id. para. 69.
56  the iCty refers to these three groups since it previously expressed the opinion that an objective deter-
mination of a religious group still remains possible. Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisić, supra note 8, para. 70.
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case law of tribunals, the membership of the protected group has been evaluated 
either from the perpetrator’s57 or the victim’s58 point of view. As De Than and Shorts 
accentuate, the victim is the one who should decide into which category he/she 
belongs, since the membership to a group is often inherited by birth. On the other 
hand, the group is targeted by the perpetrator for reasons he/she is aware of.59 As 
confirmed in the Jelisić case,
it is the stigmatization of a group as a distinct national, ethnical or racial 
unit by the community which allows it to be determined whether a targeted 
population constitutes a national, ethnical or racial group in the eyes of the 
alleged perpetrators.60
in Verdirame’s opinion, the perpetrator’s perception is “after all more important for 
establishing individual criminal responsibility than the putative ‘authentic’ ethnicity 
of the victim.”61 the subjective approach was therefore considered more appropriate 
and more “appealing, especially because the perpetrator’s intent is decisive element”62 
of the crime. therefore, from the initial rigid and objective approach to collective 
identities, the two ad hoc tribunals have thus progressively moved towards the 
subjective position. As Verdirame concluded, it is a “welcome shift that takes into 
account the mutable and contingent nature of social perceptions, and does not 
reinforce perilous claims to authenticity in the field of ethnic and racial identities.”63
Nevertheless, in further elaboration on determining the protected group, 
international courts have decided to embrace a combination of both approaches 
and consult both objective and subjective criteria,64 because “subjective criteria alone 
57  Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisić, supra note 8, para. 70; Prosecutor v. Radoslav Krstić, supra note 15, para. 557.
58  Prosecutor v. Georges Anderson Nderubumwe Rutaganda, supra note 8, para. 56; Prosecutor v. Radoslav 
Krstić, supra note 15, para. 559; Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brđanin, supra note 34, para. 683.
59  See more at de than & shorts 2003, at 70–71.
60  Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisić, supra note 8, para. 70. the trial Chamber emphasized that it partly follows the 
position taken in Prosecutor v. Clément Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana, Case No. iCtr-95-1-t, Judgment, 
21 May 1999, para. 98. See also Prosecutor v. Vidoje Blagojević and Dragan Jokić, Case No. it-02-60-t, 
Judgment, 17 January 2005, para. 667; Prosecutor v. Radoslav Krstić, supra note 15, para. 557.
61  verdirame 2000, at 594.
62  william A. schabas, Groups Protected by the Genocide Convention: Conflicting Interpretations from the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 6(2) iLsA Journal of international & Comparative Law 375, 
384 (2000).
63  verdirame 2000, at 594.
64  Prosecutor v. Vidoje Blagojević and Dragan Jokić, supra note 60, para. 667; Prosecutor v. Radoslav 
Brđanin, supra note 34, para. 684; Prosecutor v. Juvénal Kajelijeli, Case No. iCtr-98-44A-t, Judgment 
and sentence, 1 december 2003, para. 811; Prosecutor v. Zdravko Tolimir, supra note 34, para. 735; 
Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić, supra note 8, para. 541; Prosecutor v. Tharcisse Muvunyi, Case No. iCtr-
2000-55A-t, Judgment and sentence, 12 september 2006, para. 484.
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may not be sufficient to determine the group targeted for the destruction.”65 that 
approach was welcomed in the jurisprudence of the iCJ, as well.66 supporting that 
view, it could be concluded that the correct determination of the relevant protected 
group has to be made on a case-by-case basis,67 consulting thereby both objective 
and subjective criteria, and that it should be “assessed in the light of particular 
political, social, historical and cultural context.”68
2.1.1. National Group
Although the term “national” was favoured by Lemkin69 and originally included 
in the draft of the General Assembly resolution 96(i), it has been eliminated from 
its final text with no particular explanation. in the process of its reintroduction and 
incorporation into the text of the Genocide Convention, some explanations for the 
exclusion of national groups were offered before the sixth Committee.70 they generally 
referred to the lack of clarity, the ability of people to freely join or leave that group, 
possibility of being confused with political groups, etc.71 the last argument was the 
reason why ethnical groups were subsequently added to the list.72 regardless, the term 
national was included in the final text of the Genocide Convention and enumerated 
as the first on the list of protected groups. As LeBlanc concluded, it was “apparently 
assumed by everyone concerned that national group should be covered.”73
in the attempt to find an objective definition of national group and by citing 
the judgment from the Nottebohm case before the iCJ,74 the iCtr defines a national 
65  Prosecutor v. Georges Anderson Nderubumwe Rutaganda, supra note 8, para. 57; Prosecutor v. Radoslav 
Brđanin, supra note 34, paras. 683 and 684; Prosecutor v. Zdravko Tolimir, supra note 34, para. 735, 
footnote 3095.
66  Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), supra note 10, para. 191.
67  Prosecutor v. Radoslav Krstić, supra note 15, para. 513; Prosecutor v. Vidoje Blagojević and Dragan Jokić, 
supra note 60, para. 646; Prosecutor v. Zdravko Tolimir, supra note 34, para. 738; Prosecutor v. Radovan 
Karadžić, supra note 8, para. 541.
68  Prosecutor v. Georges Anderson Nderubumwe Rutaganda, supra note 8, para. 58; Prosecutor v. Alfred 
Musema, supra note 39, para. 163; Prosecutor v. Ignace Bagilishema, Case No. iCtr-95-1A-t, Judgment, 
7 June 2001, para. 65; Prosecutor v. Radoslav Krstić, supra note 15, supra note 15, para. 557.
69  schabas 2009, at 136.
70  the provisions of the General Assembly resolution 96(i) were invoked in the two committees before 
the Genocide Convention has been adopted: the Ad Hoc Committee of the economic and social 
Council and the sixth Committee of the uN G.A. different opinions were expressed in both committees 
on what kind of groups should be protected by the Convention. See more at Lawrence J. LeBlanc, 
The United Nations Genocide Convention and Political Groups: Should the United States Propose an 
Amendment?, 13(2) yale Journal of international Law 268, 271 (1988).
71  schabas 2009, at 134.
72  Boot 2002, at 425.
73  LeBlanc 1991, at 59.
74  Nottebohm case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), 1955 i.C.J. 4.
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group as a “collection of people who are perceived to share a legal bond based 
on common citizenship, coupled with reciprocity of rights and duties.”75 But, as 
Schabas emphasized, the reference of the iCtr to the Nottebohm judgment is 
incomplete, since the iCJ was interested in establishing “nationality” and focused 
on the correspondence between the state and the individual on granting nationality, 
while the iCtr’s task was to decide on the membership in a “national group.” these 
two nationalities should not be confused.76 Furthermore, nationality seems to be set 
quite widely if it includes citizenship of the state,77 but, besides citizenship, it could 
also refer to the inhabitants of the national territory and, in that case, “it hardly 
differs from the concept of a civilian population in the definition of crimes against 
humanity.”78
Looking this way, especially the definition set out in the Akayesu case, one can ask 
whether the term nationality is in conformity with the requirement of stability and 
permanency? since the iCtr has concluded that genocide “was allegedly perceived 
as targeting only ‘stable’ groups, constituted in a permanent fashion and membership 
of which is determined by birth,”79 then the reference to the “legal bond based on 
a common citizenship” in the definition of national group set out in Akayesu case 
could hardly be perceived as a stable element. Nevertheless, the issue of a national 
group as a protected group seemed to be of no particular interest before the iCtr 
since the protected group in its case law has been classified as ethnical group.
2.1.2. Ethnical Group
similar to the notion of the national group, ethnical groups have been included 
in the draft of the General Assembly resolution 96(i), but were later excluded from 
its final text as well as from the draft of the Genocide Convention. it seems that 
some drafters found term quite blurry and unclear,80 while others supported the 
protection for that particular group, which is smaller than a nation “but one whose 
existence could nevertheless be of benefit to humanity.”81 the term was proposed 
by the swedish delegation in the attempt “to avoid the exclusion of groups with 
the same cultural and historical heritage or language that would not be considered 
75  Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, supra note 8, para. 512. By Boot, the conclusion might be drawn that 
the iCtr had in mind the existence of a common culture or a common language in contrast to some 
other groups. Boot 2002, at 430.
76  schabas 2009, at 135.
77  LeBlanc 1991, at 60.
78  Luban 2006, at 16.
79  Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, supra note 8, para. 511.
80  For example, several delegations emphasized that the words “ethnic” and “racial” practically mean the 
same thing. See more at LeBlanc 1991, at 59.
81  schabas 2009, at 144, in citing soviet argument in the sixth Committee, footnote 165.
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to be national groups.”82 in order to “better define the types of groups protected 
by the Convention and ensure that the term ‘national’ would not be understood 
as encompassing purely political groups,”83 the reference to an ethnic group was 
consequently (yet narrowly) adopted and added to the Genocide Convention.84
the first identification of an ethnic group was provided in the Akayesu case, 
revealing thereby the enumeration of protected groups as being too restrictive, 
as will be shown in the continuation of this paper. An ethnic group was generally 
defined as a group “whose members share a common language or culture.”85 however, 
the tribunal has faced a specific problem while trying to apply that definition to 
rwandan atrocities and to define the protected group. when faced with the problem 
of identifying the differences between the members of the hutu and tutsi tribes, 
the iCtr had to conclude that they actually speak the same language, believe in 
the same myths, and share the same territory and culture, so “one can hardly talk 
of ethnic groups.”86 it was clear that tutsis “did not closely match any of the four 
definitions.”87 Nevertheless, even though it was hard to perceive their differences “in 
the context of the period in question,” they were considered both by the authorities 
and themselves as belonging to two distinct ethnic groups. their ethnicity was clearly 
determined in official classifications since their identity cards88 contained a reference 
of person’s ethnicity.89 Furthermore, the former Constitution of rwanda also “identified 
rwandans by reference to their ethnic group.”90 Moreover, as confirmed before the 
iCtr, all the rwandan witnesses who appeared before the iCtr invariably answered 
“spontaneously and without hesitation” on the question of their ethnic identity91 
and they expressed general knowledge on ethnicity of their friends or neighbours.92 
Finally, tutsis were understood as an ethnic group “by those who targeted them 
for killing.”93 Accordingly, tutsis were regarded as a stable and permanent group, 
82  Boot 2002, at 425.
83  Prosecutor v. Radoslav Krstić, supra note 15, para. 555.
84  Boot 2002, at 425.
85  Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, supra note 8, para. 513.
86  Id. footnote 56. See also Prosecutor v. Clément Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana, supra note 60, para. 34.
87  verdirame 2000, at 592.
88  Nevertheless, the possibility to pay for the change of one’s ethnicity on the identity card was mentioned 
in kayishema and ruzindana case. See Prosecutor v. Clément Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana, supra 
note 60, para. 12.
89  Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, supra note 8, footnote 56.
90  Id. para. 170.
91  Id. para. 702.
92  Id. para. 171.
93  Id.
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identified as such by all. it was added that rwandan customary rules regarding 
the ethnicity followed the patrilineal heredity line;94 ethnicity of a rwandan child is 
therefore derived from the ethnicity of the father.95 the identification of persons is 
therefore “embedded in rwandan culture.”96
in the process of shifting from the objective to the subjective approach of 
identification, the definition of the ethnic group from the Akayesu case has been 
subsequently extended. As Verdirame concluded, the tribunals were beginning 
to acknowledge that collective identities, ethnicity in particular, represent social 
constructs which are “dependent on variable and contingent perceptions” and do not 
represent social facts which are “verifiable in the same manner as natural phenomena 
or physical facts.”97 By embracing that shift, the iCtr offered additional definitions 
based on the subjective self-identification that an ethnic group is a group which 
distinguishes itself from others, as well as on the identification by others, when the 
role of the perpetrator and his view of the protected group is crucial.98
self-identification is quite understandable since the individual is aware of his own 
ethnicity. however, the question is how stable and permanent this factor can be. 
As Alison Desforges, an expert witness in the Akayesu case concluded:
the primary criterion for [defining] an ethnic group is the sense of 
belonging to that ethnic group. it is a sense which can shift over time… the 
definition of the group to which one feels allied may change over time. But, 
if you fix any given moment in time, and you say, how does this population 
divide itself, then you will see which ethnic groups are in existence in the 
minds of the participants at that time.99
Basically, if we agree with that conclusion, which refers specifically to the ethnic 
group, we can also further conclude that this approach can be applied to most of 
the groups protected by the Genocide Convention.
On the other hand, the role of the perpetrator in committing genocide is 
indisputable. he undertakes genocidal acts with the belief to destroy a particular 
group on which his intention is focused. it makes sense to view ethnicity from 
his point of view; he knows his enemies. Nevertheless, the determination of 
ethnicity established by others implies that the ethnic group “may exist only in 
94  Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, supra note 8, para. 171.
95  Prosecutor v. Clément Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana, supra note 60, para. 523.
96  Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, supra note 8, para. 171. three officially recognized ethnic groups in 
rwanda are hutus, tutsis and twas.
97  verdirame 2000, at 592.
98  Prosecutor v. Clément Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana, supra note 60, para. 98.
99  Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, supra note 8, para. 172.
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the imaginations of its persecutors.”100 it could lead to an unusual situation. As Boot 
concluded, if a perpetrator thought that a victim is of a different national, racial, 
ethnical, of religious group than he is, but the victim is not, it could result in finding 
a perpetrator guilty of genocide.101 Although he is mistaken in his actions and the goal, 
his unfortunate belief (along with other genocidal elements) makes him responsible 
for genocide.
2.1.3. Racial Group
during the drafting process of the Genocide Convention, the term racial 
seemed to be easy to understand and it was the only category that did not lead 
to a debate.102 Nevertheless, according to some authors the concept of race “has 
changed considerably”103 in past few decades. Back then, it was to a large extent 
a synonym for national, religious, and ethnic groups, but this no longer corresponds 
to its contemporary usage.104 Nowadays the “conflation of race with nationality 
has ceased.”105 the value of the term race is now disputed from a purely scientific 
standpoint. One could even argue that the scientific progress in genetics and biology 
of the past decades has determined that since there is no gene for race, it is then 
scientifically incorrect to speak of different human races. in colloquial language, 
however, the understanding of race is still very much connected with the physical 
appearance of people, skin color in particular, and is still being commonly used to 
determine members of a racial group.106
the intention of the iCtr to provide a definition of a racial group in the Akayesu 
case has resulted in its focus on the “hereditary physical traits often identified 
with a geographical region, irrespective of linguistic, cultural, national or religious 
factors.”107 that definition was given with no particular reference to any authority.108 
Among other definitions offered in Akayesu, it has been viewed as “unnecessarily 
narrow”109 since hereditary physical traits may be difficult to distinguish in many 
cases, and reference to heredity “preserves an outdated and contentious method 
100  Luban 2006, at 16.
101  Boot 2002, at 435.
102  schabas 2009, at 121, 139.
103  Lingas 2016, at 84.
104  schabas 2009, at 140, 143.
105  Lingas 2016, at 84.
106  Id.
107  Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, supra note 8, paras. 514.
108  Lingas 2016, at 93.
109  Boot 2002, at 433.
SANDRA FABIJANIĆ GAGRO 117
of classifying people.”110 with global miscegenation being present worldwide, it could 
seem quite challenging nowadays to determine the racial affiliation.
On the other hand, although the term racial group may be obsolete, this concept 
persists in science, popular usage, and international law. it is understandable that 
progressive jurists search for a meaning that is consistent with contemporary values. 
Nevertheless, as Schabas emphasizes, when it comes to the stability and permanency, 
it seems that it is the only group, when defined genetically, to which the person 
belongs or not; the question of race is not changeable. All other groups seem to be 
neither stable nor permanent and could be modified as a result of border changes 
or a simple decision of the individual, etc.111
2.1.4. Religious Group
religious groups could be described as those “whose members share the same 
religion, denomination or mode of worship.”112 Although they are listed as protected 
in the General Assembly resolution 96(i), some questions regarding their inclusion in 
Genocide Convention have been raised during the drafting process,113 provoking the 
most serious disagreement.114 religious group has been considered similar to ethnic 
or national group. during the drafting process, some underlined that religious group 
should be considered as a subgroup of a national group, since “in all the known cases 
of genocide committed for a religious motive, that motive had always been connected 
with others – those of racial or national character.”115 Other delegations opposed that 
view with the argument that genocide could be committed against religious groups 
within one nation, which finally led to the rejection of that proposal.
specific confirmation of that close connection between religious and national 
groups has been given before the iCty in the Krstić case with regards to Muslims. 
Although originally seen as a religious group, Bosnian Muslims were also recognized 
as a nation in the Constitution of the former yugoslavia adopted in 1963. thirty 
years later, during the armed conflict in Bosnia and herzegovina, the Bosnian serb 
authorities considered Bosnian Muslims as a specific national group.116
the importance of religious identity is visible and recognizable in contemporary 
armed conflicts, which create recipient surroundings for genocide. Furthermore, some 
new examples of conflicts worldwide, such as the development of the phenomenon 
110  Lingas 2016, at 93.
111  schabas 2000, at 382.
112  Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, supra note 8, para. 515.
113  schabas 2009, at 147.
114  LeBlanc 1988, at 271.
115  LeBlanc 1991, at 58.
116  Prosecutor v. Radoslav Krstić, supra note 15, para. 559.
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of terrorism, are (too) often rooted in religion, which further confirms the significance 
of the issues of religious affiliation and differences in the contemporary world.
3. Considerations of Possible Extension of the List  
of Protected Groups
A further important question related to the determination of the group is whether 
the protection from the Genocide Convention should be limited to these four groups 
expressly mentioned? is it possible to discuss genocide if the group, although stable 
and permanent, does not meet the criterion for being determined as national, ethnic, 
racial, or religious? Moreover, is it even necessary for the protected group to be stable 
and permanent? if not, does the enumeration of the group in the meaning of the 
Genocide Convention represent a limiting factor? the fact is that, in some cases, it 
is quite difficult to determine the clear differences between the opposed parties, 
as it was the case between the hutus and tutsis in rwanda. Furthermore, one could 
ask whether the omission of some other groups is incompatible with the “mission” 
embraced by the General Assembly resolution 96(i) – to protect the existence of 
entire human groups and prevent the destruction of racial, religious, political, and 
other groups. it is undisputed that the General Assembly’s interpretation of the 
groups has transformed from a non-exhaustive list to an exhaustive four-group list 
in the Genocide Convention through the period of only two years.117
the willingness to extend the enumeration of protected groups was noticeable in 
the early case law of the iCtr. when considering whether the protected group should 
be limited to the four groups enumerated in the Genocide Convention or “whether 
any group, similar to the four groups in terms of its stability and permanence, should 
also be included,” the tribunal in the Akayesu case emphasized the necessity “to 
respect the intention of the drafters of the Genocide Convention.” According to 
the travaux préparatoires, their intention was “clearly to protect any stable and 
permanent group.”118
some authors support the opinion that the drafters intention was focused on the 
protection of stable groups only – those “having an enduring identity.”119 Given the 
historical context in which the drafters were operating, that would make sense.120 the 
iCtr’s decision in the Akayesu case was closely connected with the before-mentioned 
doubt whether the hutu and tutsi could be considered as distinct on ethnic or 
117  david shea Bettwy, The Genocide Convention and Unprotected Groups: Is the Scope of Protection 
Expanding Under Customary International Law?, 2(1) Notre dame Journal of international & 
Comparative Law 167, 174 (2011).
118  Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, supra note 8, para. 701.
119  LeBlanc 1991, at 60–61.
120  LeBlanc 1988, at 273.
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racial grounds, and it was designed to justify the tribunal’s finding that the tutsi 
were an ethnic group.121 But, on the other hand, in Boot’s opinion, by doing that, the 
tribunal went beyond the terms of the Genocide Convention and the statute of the 
iCtr, violating thereby the nullum crimen sine lege principle.122 As Schabas observed, 
that conclusion from the Akayesu case was a “somewhat extravagant reading of the 
travaux.”123 its role is to assist in clarifying unreasonable, ambiguous, or obscure terms, 
not to add some new elements to the definitions.124 Bettwy emphasized that even 
though the conclusion from Akayesu was bold and controversial, it nevertheless 
brought attention to the importance of elements of stability and permanence, and 
also reinforced the significance of respecting the purpose and object of the Genocide 
Convention.125 in the tribunal’s opinion, that object and the purpose with regards to 
the protected groups is threefold: a) in order “to respect the prestige of the crime 
of genocide” the scope of protected groups must be exhaustive and exclusive; 
b) the groups included are those substantially valuable to the mankind and their 
loss would have a strong impact on the human race as a whole; c) the stability and 
permanency of the group is requested to the degree that its membership is, for 
the most part, involuntary. therefore, an extension of the list and the inclusion of 
some other groups126 with no characteristics of being stable, permanent, or easily 
identifiable would create uncertainty and ambiguity and could be considered as 
disregarding the object and purpose of the Convention.127 hence, some would say 
that despite the passing of time and criticism expressed throughout, the definition 
of genocide is well established, clearly understandable, and supported as such.
however, Schabas emphasizes that the intention of the drafters confirmed in the 
Akayesu case was actually not clear at all.128 the opinion raises the following question: 
if the intention of the drafters was to protect all stable and permanent groups, why 
did they simply did not do so and incorporate those words into the text?129 the fact is 
that the determination of “stable and permanent groups” has not been subsequently 
121  Currie 2010, at 112.
122  See more at Boot 2002, at 431.
123  schabas 2009, at 152.
124  schabas 2000, at 380.
125  however, he further points out, the capture of the purpose and object was only partial, because 
the decision in Akayesu “did not acknowledge that the drafters clearly intended to keep the list of 
protected groups exhaustive.” Bettwy 2011, at 181.
126  Following groups were considered by drafters, but excluded from the final text: ideological, linguistic, 
economic and political. See more at Bettwy 2011, at 169, 176.
127  Id. at 195. See also de than & shorts 2003, at 67.
128  schabas 2000, at 382.
129  Id. at 380.
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followed within domestic legislation as a possible extension of the protected group 
or in the further jurisprudence of international courts.
On the other hand, the support for the inclusion of other groups within the 
meaning of genocide is visible in academic circles and substantiated by experiences 
in practice.130 Moreover, some national legislatures confirm the idea of expanding the 
list of groups protected by the Genocide Convention.131 Being aware of the horrifying 
consequences of genocidal intent, while taking into consideration the existence 
of the human group that is at stake and difficulties which the iCtr faced with the 
determination whether tutsis represent an ethnic group or not, one could argue 
that it would be justified and logical to extend the protection from that scourge to 
all groups of people regardless on their name and qualifications. One could further 
agree that there is no longer a principled reason for insisting that only those groups 
enumerated in the Convention adopted many years ago deserve protection on 
the basis of their “exclusiveness” of just being on the list. when discussing stability 
and permanency of the protected group as its basic elements, the question arises 
whether any of the protected groups is stable and permanent enough to be included 
on that exclusive list in the Genocide Convention? Could we support the conclusion 
that a religious group is more stable than a group of women chosen, for example, 
for destruction only because of their gender? As mentioned before, some of the 
protected groups seem to be neither stable nor permanent, and with no particular 
definition set forth for their clear determination, they overlap and could be changed 
as a result of different reasons.132 One could say that such group “exclusivity” and 
narrowness of the Convention regarding the object of protection represents a clear 
restrictive element. By embracing that narrow enumeration while excluding some 
other groups, the protection from genocide may be perceived as not sufficient 
enough; it leaves many unprotected.
special attention in this field has to be given to the issue of political groups. 
Although they were included in the General Assembly resolution 96(i) and the draft 
of the Genocide Convention, political groups have been excluded from the final 
text. some authors argue that it was a “deliberate omission”133 which has led to the 
one of the “major flaws”134 of the genocide definition. when looking for the element 
of stability in defining the protected group, such exclusion could be considered 
reasonable. Political groups lack the element of permanency; they have no stability 
130  See more at schabas 2009, at 166.
131  in accordance with the French Penal Code from 1992, genocide is defined as intentional destruction 
of any group based on arbitrary criteria; romanian Criminal Code includes “community” on the list 
of protected groups. See more at Bettwy 2011, at 182; schabas 2000, at 375–376.
132  schabas 2000, at 382.
133  Cassese 2003, at 96.
134  Boot 2002, at 403.
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or clear-cut characteristics,135 and being a member of political groups is a fruit of 
decision. in relation to other protected groups, whose membership does not change 
over a relatively long period of time, political groups are not perceived to be stable 
or permanent.
however, this is not the only reason for their exclusion from the list. the question 
is also raised how political groups could be defined in a first place.136 A further and 
perhaps the most important reason, which states would almost certainly wish 
to avoid,137 is the fear that the inclusion of political groups could lead to foreign 
interference in internal political affairs. it could also create difficulties for a legally 
established government to take preventive measures against subversive elements 
on its own territory.138 Another argument was also that the protection of political 
groups ought to be considered in the broader context of human rights, rather than 
the narrower one of genocide.139 in Bettwy’s opinion, by excluding political and other 
groups, drafters tried “to avoid groups whose inclusion would be unnecessary or 
impractical, favouring instead the tightest enumeration possible.”140 Furthermore, 
the travaux préparatoires indicate that the drafters were mindful of the intention 
to include in the final text only those groups “whose loss would have a negative 
impact, and that this requirement may have been fatal to the inclusion of political 
groups.”141
On the other hand, many persons, scholars, and non-scholars alike argue that 
the inapplicability of the Genocide Convention to situations similar to genocide, but 
not characterized as genocide because the victims are political opponents and they 
could not be recognized as members of protected groups, is deeply disturbing. this 
is not the question of being a member of a protected group, but rather the question 
of being a victim. Political groups are perceived as enemies of the state, or perhaps 
of a particular leader or a group of “others.” the nature of the group in such situations 
is not of so much importance, but the horror and magnitude of the political crimes 
that we have been witnessing through history “have persuaded some that it would 
have been desirable to extend protection to political groups.”142 Accordingly, few 
national penal systems worldwide had a reference to political genocide.143
135 Boot 2002, at 426.
136  LeBlanc 1988, at 295.
137  de than & shorts 2003, at 68.
138  Boot 2002, at 426.
139  LeBlanc 1988, at 274.
140  Bettwy 2011, at 176.
141  Id. at 179.
142  LeBlanc 1991, at 85.
143  See the list at Bettwy 2011, at 184, footnote 117.
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Nevertheless, the exclusion of political, economic, or any other groups of civilians 
does not mean that such groups are left unprotected. their destruction could be 
seen as a crime against humanity when the persecution of members of some other 
groups (other than national, ethnic, religious, and racial) is in question. in that case 
even though it does not represent a case of genocide the perpetrator could still be 
punished, but for some other crime.
Conclusion
when the term genocide is being discussed in everyday language and among 
people who lack specific knowledge of the elements of the definition, that crime 
seems to be easy to understand – every single case of mass murder or grave breaches 
of human rights, looking from the eye of non-juristic public or media, could be 
perceived as genocide. Nevertheless, the legal situation is not so simple and, even 
though some similarities with other core crimes exist, genocide is clearly defined and 
distinguished from other crimes. Lack of some prescribed elements in the definition 
brings into question the existence of genocide. however, it does not mean that 
the commission of the crime in question is being denied; it merely needs to be 
recognized by some other name.
that underlines two main challenges that prosecution for genocide is faced with. 
the first challenge is the necessity for dolus specialis to be established. that particular 
ultimate intention of the perpetrator to destroy a group of people is the element 
that makes genocide an exceptionally grave crime and distinguishes it from other 
core crimes. For example, killing as an element of genocidal actus reus is not “just an 
ordinary” killing – it has a higher and more horrifying purpose of destroying a group 
in whole or in part, as such. the second challenge, and one of the most controversial 
aspects of the genocide definition, is the object of the perpetrator’s intent. it is essential 
to prove that the perpetrator does not want to destroy just any group he is focused 
on, but that the main goal of his actions and the object of his intention is a specific 
national, ethnical, racial, or religious group. his victims have been chosen because they 
belong to a specific previously enumerated group. however, if the victims could not be 
identified as members of a protected group, but have instead been chosen because 
of their political beliefs, sexual orientation, or gender, one could not speak about 
genocide, regardless of the number of victims or the scale of atrocities, or any other 
reason. the Genocide Convention was adopted exactly seventy years ago, but the 
enumeration of four protected groups with no particular definitions or explanations 
of the elements of each of them, still remains the subject of discussions.
with regards to the lack of definitions of protected groups, one could further 
argue that it is not even likely that some acceptable definitions could be agreed upon. 
therefore, it is up to the courts to draw conclusions on a case-by-case basis. dealing 
with such a rule actually allows the law to modify and stay flexible and applicable in 
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various situations and in a different period of time. when considering the differences 
between social, religious, cultural, or any other surroundings that genocide may occur 
within, the rules can be more efficiently applicable if there is no existence of a strict 
definition. that being said, it does not mean that terms without explanations are 
useless, but rather that it had been the deliberate intention of the drafters of the 
Genocide Convention. however, as much as the exclusion of definitions could be 
understood as a visionary achievement and a deliberate intention of the drafters, the 
fact is that the identification of a protected group is one of the essential elements of 
genocide itself. Moreover, one could note that it is the starting point. if no identification 
of a protected group is made, one cannot speak of genocide either. therefore, the 
importance of identification must not be put aside.
regarding the fact that only four human groups are protected and given 
significance for their exclusiveness, the Genocide Convention becomes inapplicable 
in situations in which genocide-like acts have occurred, but the national, ethnic, racial, 
or religious identity of the victims is not an issue. however, it does not mean that 
individuals or even groups of people will be left unprotected. it just means that some 
other means should be used in dealing with other types of atrocities. Looking carefully 
at the drafter’s debate on the inclusion/exclusion of groups on the list of protected 
ones, it seems that the exhaustive list was their true intention; they have supported the 
tightest enumeration. After a number of groups have been examined and taken under 
consideration, several were excluded from the final text. One could argue that the 
implementation of the Genocide Convention confirms that the enumeration of these 
particular groups serves its purpose and no further extensions are to be made.
On the other hand, “struggling” with the idea of exclusiveness of the protected 
groups, while bearing in mind the horrifying consequences of genocidal intent and 
that the existence of a human group is at stake, one could argue that all human 
groups should be protected from genocide. the members of the group have been 
chosen as victims, killed, transferred, bodily or mentally harmed only because they 
belong to the particular group chosen by the perpetrator. when observed from 
this perspective, the perilous and intimidating idea of destruction that lies behind 
the crime and the perpetration of acts focused on the group exclusively should be 
essential, regardless of the name and definition of the group. that is what should 
matter the most – the possibility of a group being eliminated and the responsibility 
of the community to prevent and punish actions aimed at this goal.
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